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Crystallising the International Rule of Law: Trump’s Accidental 
Contribution to International Law
Dr. Clare Frances Moran 
There is a significant amount of political and legal anxiety surrounding 
the presidency of Donald Trump, particularly from those who view the world 
from a globalist or internationalist perspective.1 His initial executive orders 
have indicated a protectionist and nativist approach to international law: the 
infamous order to restrict entry to the U.S. by nationals from select countries 
received widespread coverage in the media.  Others, such as the nominal 
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership2 and the undertaking to build a 
wall at the U.S.-Mexico border,3 are indications of intention rather than 
decisions with wide-reaching consequences.  His policies on international 
relations are viewed here as expressions of intention without concrete effect: 
they appear as chaotic, political statements, rather than efficiently executed 
decisions set to achieve specific goals.  Many authors have already indicated 
his Presidency signals the beginning of the corrosion of legal norms,4 but there 
is limited evidence to support the idea that Trump’s Presidency will have any 
significant effect.  Conversely, his edicts have provided a timely lesson in the 
limitations of the power of the President.5
The U.S. courts have wasted no time in unanimously rejecting his power 
 1. See Trump’s environmental policy changes threaten global action, 507 ENDS 6 (2017); Alex 
M. Parker, United States: Trump’s election could change international taxes overnight, 25 TMTPR 
824–25 (2016); Richard Cornes, The Hard Work of Democracy, PUB. L.: THE CONST. & ADMIN. L. OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH, Jan. 2017, at 150; Adam Liptak, Donald Trump could threaten U.S. rule of law, 
scholars say, N. Y. TIMES (June 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/04/us/politics/donald-
trump-constitution-power.html [http://perma.cc/LB5R-QEY5]. 
 2. Memorandum from President Donald J. Trump on Withdrawal of the United States from the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement (Jan. 23, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-
withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific [http://perma.cc/LG6P-XQBR]. 
 3. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 4. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan 27, 2017). 
 5. Monica Hakimi, International Law in the Age of Trump, EJIL TALK! (Feb. 28, 2017), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/international-law-in-the-age-of-trump/ [http://perma.cc/J2LS-PWDR]; Robert 
Hennelly, The System is Failing: Donald Trump’s Rise and the Erosion of the Rule of Law, SALON 
(June 13, 2016),  
http://www.salon.com/2016/06/13/the_system_is_failing_donald_trumps_rise_and_the_erosion_of_the
_rule_of_law/ [http://perma.cc/XV73-77JY]; Clare Foran, An Erosion of Democratic Norms in 
America, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2016),  
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/donald-trump-democratic-norms/508469/ 
[http://perma.cc/C9WS-3A96]; Christoph Scheuermann, Donald Trump and the Erosion of American 
Democracy, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/trump-100-
days-the-erosion-of-american-democracy-a-1145294.html [http://perma.cc/2T24-72DH]. 
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to violate international law,6 albeit basing their reasoning on the Constitution.  
In this way, President Trump’s power, and indeed, the power of any President, 
is clearly and firmly restrained by the application of the Constitution by the 
courts.  Since the Constitution reflects many international norms, including the 
right of due process,7 certain elements of international law may be protected by 
the enforcement of constitutional provisions by the U.S. courts.  Indeed, this 
enforcement may be a means of guaranteeing the enforcement of international 
norms at the domestic level,8 and preventing the erosion of specific 
international norms.  Consequently, this presidency may demonstrate the 
usefulness of domestic courts in securing internationally-respected norms and 
identifying something of a “floor of rights.”9  In the international sphere, this 
floor would be regarded as the international rule of law; a rule which cannot be 
violated by any actor, regardless of their power.
Donald Trump’s current approach takes a nativist and protectionist view
of the world; his first speech to Congress was delivered without reference to 
internationalism10 and focused instead on the rebuilding of domestic industries, 
without concern for environmental protections.  His current approach, as noted 
above, does not show a high regard for international law and for the current 
global order.  This raises the interesting question of the distance between 
political rhetoric and political power, which can result in legally binding 
decisions.11 Consequently, this work will investigate the powers the President 
has, the effect he may have on the domestic system, and the impact he could 
have at the international level.  Effectively, this work tackles the question of 
what effect Trump’s actions, as well as his words,12 can have on the 
international system, particularly as the office of President is often regarded as 
the most powerful in the world.13
 6. Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 469608 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 8. Armin von Bogdandy, Matthias Goldmann, & Ingo Venzke, From Public International to 
International Public Law: Translating World Public Opinion into International Public Authority, 28 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 115, 115–145 (2017); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Plurality in the Fabric of 
International Courts and Tribunals: the Threads of a Managerial Approach, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 13, 13–
72 (2017). 
 9. Coined originally as a labor law term by Lord Wedderburn.  KENNETH WEDDERBURN, THE 
WORKER AND THE LAW, (Penguin, 3d ed. 1986). 
 10. Donald J. Trump, Inaugural Address: Trump’s Full Speech, CNN (Jan. 20, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-inaugural-address/index.html [http://perma.cc/GB8M-
3P64]. 
 11. See JULIAN KU & JOHN YOO, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 139 et seq. (OUP, 2012) for a discussion of the 
International Economic Emergency Powers Act, which illustrates this point. 
 12. For a discussion in the context of Presidential words in the context of the Avena case, see L. 
Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts – The United States Supreme Court Declines to 
Enforce the ICJ’s Avena Judgment Relating to a U.S. Obligation under the Convention on Consular 
Relations, 9 GERMAN L. J. 619 (2008); John King Gamble & Christine M. Giuliano, Case Comment: 
U.S. Supreme Court, Medellin v. Texas: More than an Assiduous Building Inspector?, 22 LEIDEN J. OF 
INT’L L. 150, 150–69 (2009). 
 13. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (Belknap 
Press eds., 2013). 
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This Article will explore the impact of powerful domestic systems, using 
the United States as an example, on the international rule of law.  The idea is to 
explore the effect that presidential power has on the international system and
the constitutional restraints which exist on presidential power.  This will also 
involve a discussion of the significance of Congress and the Constitution, and 
specific focus will be rendered on the role of the Supreme Court will be debated.  
As the final interpreter of U.S. Constitutional norms,14 the Supreme Court has 
a significant amount of power, and thus may have a significant impact at the 
international level.  There is a clear link between the domestic and international 
system, but this will be explored in the context of the impact that domestic 
systems have on international law.  The way in which the U.S. Constitution 
reflects international law, guaranteeing certain norms at the domestic level, will 
be discussed, as well as the importance of democratic domestic systems with 
solid constitutional protections for international law.  This work will conclude 
by postulating how Trump’s Presidency may crystallize the international rule 
of law, furthering its development by the U.S. courts.
Although powerful from an international perspective, there are many 
domestic restraints on the power of the U.S. President in his acts at the 
international level.  Indeed, particularly from an external perspective, the 
President is significantly restrained by the U.S. Constitution15 and, 
consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court.16 The Constitution lays out the powers 
of Congress and specifically, its areas of responsibility, which extend over a 
great number of areas.  The President’s constitutional responsibilities, however, 
are much more circumscribed; a point acknowledged by President Truman, 
who noted the gap between the expectations and reality of the office.17  The 
President’s power to act on the international plane relate to his legal, 
constitutional responsibilities and his power as the central representative of the 
U.S., in that he can make policy and undertake diplomatic acts.  The latter form 
of his power is much greater, but the legal effect of that power is debatable.  
This section will look in detail at the restraints on Presidential power, including 
the power of the President to veto legislation and to make executive orders, 
which affect international law and international relations.
Although the constitutional basis for government in the U.S. is that the 
President and Congress work harmoniously together, the constitutional 
provisions relating to international affairs separate the roles out to deal with 
 14. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Charles M. Lamb and Lisa K. Parshall, 
United States v. Nixon Revisited: A Case Study in Supreme Court Decision-making, 58 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 71 (1996). 
 15. Article II of the United States Constitution lays out the President’s powers; Article I notes 
the extensive powers of Congress. 
 16. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237 (wherein the United States Supreme Court noted its “ultimate 
authority” to interpret the Constitution); Louis Henkin, Executive Privilege: Mr. Nixon Loses but the 
Presidency Largely Prevails, 22 UCLA L. REV. 40 (1974). 
 17. RICHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS (Free Press 
1991). 
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certain issues.  The President should make treaties with the backing of the 
Senate18 and is not capable of unilaterally agreeing to a treaty.  Henkin notes 
that federal authority for foreign affairs is given to the President via the U.S. 
Constitution19 because of the duty to form a “more perfect union.”  This also 
finds persuasive authority in the constitutional responsibility of the President to 
exercise executive power, without any explicit limitation.20 Henkin then goes 
on to note that the power to form treaties is limited by the requirement to refer 
such treaties to the Senate and that treaties can be placed in “cold storage” by 
the Senate; rather than sending the treaty to its grave, they can prevaricate 
through inaction.21
Although Congress has the power to restrain the President from ratifying 
treaties, international law is not simply formed through treaties.  The daily
exercise of political power and political discussion is within the gift of the 
President, and, in the words of Henkin, “the President is always in session.”22
Thus, executive orders and executive agreements can be made by the President 
to undertake international obligations, which, although do not emanate from the 
U.S. Constitution, may commit the U.S. to international obligations.  Thus, the 
President may make executive agreements with or without the backing of 
Congress.23 A recent example of the negative exercise of such power was the 
decision to withdraw U.S. agreement from the Paris Agreement,24 which was 
possible because of the form of the U.S.’s agreement to the text.  As the 
agreement took the form of a President executive agreement, the President 
could withdraw his assent without Congressional approval.  Although there is 
a requirement to submit any international agreements to Congress within sixty 
days of agreement,25 compliance with this rule is not guaranteed.26 The power 
to act unilaterally has been approved by the U.S. Supreme Court,27 which 
demonstrates the significant amount of power that the Supreme Court has in 
relation to the exercise of Presidential power.
The continued reverence, veneration28 even, of constitutional norms 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 19. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 284, 288 (1987). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 21. Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 411 (1989). 
 22. Louis Henkin, A More Effective System for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional 
Framework, 61 VA. L. REV. 751, 755 (1975). 
 23. Daniel Bodansky, Legal options for U.S. Acceptance of a new climate change agreement, 
CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS (2015); see also Joe Morehead, Treaties and Executive 
Agreements, 55 THE SERIALS LIBRARIAN 615 (2008). 
 24. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html 
[http://perma.cc/B5R4-NSYQ]. 
 25. 1 U.S.C. § 112b. 
 26. See Kiki Caruson & Victoria A. Farrar-Myers, Promoting the President’s Foreign Policy 
Agenda: Presidential Use of Executive Agreements as Policy Vehicles, 60 POL. RES. Q. 631, 631–44 
(2007). 
 27. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 28. Kevin Cope, Congress’s International Legal Discourse, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1115, 1141 (2015). 
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ignores the limitations generated by an originalist reading of the U.S. 
Constitution: such a perspective pays little heed to the distance between the 
drafting of the U.S. Constitution and the gradual development of constitutional 
tools, such as executive agreements, which are not mentioned in the U.S. 
Constitution.  Thus, the President is restrained by Congress to a certain extent, 
but only insofar as the U.S. Constitution dictates.  The restraints, as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court, are a more significant constraint on Presidential power: 
as confirmed in Nixon v. United States,29 the Supreme Court is the “ultimate 
authority” on the interpretation of constitutional norms.30  As Marbury v. 
Madison31 demonstrates, the Supreme Court also considers itself capable of 
declaring legislative acts of Congress void.  This may happen where the acts 
violate constitutional norms or are “repugnant” to the written constitution, 
which is held as the defined limits of domestic legislative power.32 The
Supreme Court has also prevented the President from imposing international 
law on individual U.S. states,33 placing its power in relation to international 
law above that of the President’s.
It is perhaps worth noting prior to moving on to the next part of the 
argument that similar powers exist in other mature democracies.  As an 
illustration, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has the power to enter, 
and withdraw from, international agreements on a unilateral basis.34 The sole 
caveat is that there must be Parliamentary backing for any such action, but the 
extent to which this ought to be proved is limited.35  In other words, political 
pressure is the only “constitutional” requirement that would restrain the Prime 
Minister from acting.  A recent example of such a restraint was the Prime 
Minister’s intention to trigger article 50, to signal the UK’s intent to leave the 
European Union (“EU”), without a parliamentary vote.36 Despite a referendum 
in favor of leaving the EU, the UK Supreme Court decreed that a parliamentary 
vote would be required in advance of triggering article 50.37 It is also worth 
noting the parallel importance in both the UK and U.S. of their respective 
Supreme Courts, and the restraints both place on modern executive power.
The role of the Supreme Court in constraining Presidential power should 
not be underestimated; as the guardian of the U.S. Constitution, it plays a 
 29. Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 30. See id. 
 31. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 32. Id. at 178. 
 33. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See Peter Spiro, Resurrecting Missouri v. Holland, 
73 MO. L. R. 1029 (2008). 
 34. See HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Routledge, 12th ed. 
2017) for a discussion of the prerogative powers of the UK Prime Minister. 
 35. See Anthony W Bradley, Keith D Ewing and Christopher J Knight, Constitutional and 
administrative law (Pearson, 16th ed. 2015) at 252-9 and James Grant, Prerogative, parliament and 
creative constitutional adjudication: reflections on Miller, 28 K.L.J. 35 (2017). 
 36. R (on the application of Miller and another) (Respondents) v. Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union (Appellant) [2017] UKSC 5. 
 37. Id. 
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significant part in ensuring the rule of law is secure in the United States.  The 
issue then arises of whether the United States Supreme Court is limited in only 
being able to interpret constitutional norms, or whether it may incorporate 
international law into its rulings.  This is particularly significant where we are 
beyond Brierly’s notion of domestic courts “comparatively rarely” dealing with 
international norms.38 In fact, we now arrive at a point where domestic courts 
can interpret and develop norms of international law, and may in fact be the 
primary defenders of the international law.  The normative choices39 that the 
U.S. Supreme Court is called upon to make will be dealt with later in this piece, 
but the significance of the Supreme Court in guaranteeing and enforcing 
constitutional norms, beyond the power of both Congress and the President has 
been proved.  The relationship between such a domestic system, rooted in 
democratic constitutional principles, and international law shall be investigated 
next.
The branches of government noted above identify the U.S. as a democratic 
system, and one which is active in the international sphere.  The written 
constitution of the U.S. was drafted to secure its international position and to 
appeal to other countries so as to legitimize its existence at the beginning of the 
Republic.40  It is thus evident that the Republic existed prior to the U.S. 
Constitution, but that the Constitution was required to further the validity of the 
Republic’s existence.  As Professor Himsworth noted in 1996, the global order 
which existed then, and which persists today, continues to rely on nation 
states,41 all of which require constitutional principles in order to function.  In 
his work, Himsworth poses the question of whether constitutions require nation 
states.42 In partial answer to his question, we have not yet been able to divorce 
constitutionalism from the nation state and consequently, we still require states 
to create and enforce constitutions.  Even in the cases of those who promote 
and endorse the idea of “global constitutionalism,”43 recourse to the nation state 
is required for the formation of treaties, the identification of customary 
international law, and the enforcement of human rights, seen by many as the 
lynchpin of a constitutional order.44  The building and the enforcement of 
 38. Antonios Tzanakopoulos & Christian J. Tams, Introduction: Domestic Courts as Agents of 
Development of International Law, 26 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 531, 533 (2013) (quoting J. L. Brierly, 
International Law in England, 51 L. Q. REV. 24, 25 (1935)). 
 39. Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 
42 Duke L. J. 979 (1993). 
 40. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 47. (2004). 
 41. C.M.G. Himsworth, In a State No Longer: The End of Constitutionalism?, PUB. L. 639–660 
(1996). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Erika De Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 51 (2006); 
Michel Rosenfeld, Is Global Constitutionalism Meaningful or Desirable?, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 177 
(2014). 
 44. See Robert McCorquodale, Defining the International Rule of Law: Defying Gravity? 65 
INT’L COMP. L. Q. 277 (2016); Samantha Besson, Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy, 22 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 373 (2011); Kenneth J. Keith, John Dugard Lecture - The International Rule of Law 
(2015), 28 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 403 (2015); THOMAS BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW (Penguin, 2010); 
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norms such as human rights are entirely dependent on their execution and 
enforcement by domestic courts.45  In this section, the link between domestic 
constitutional law and international law will be explored on the basis that 
international law relies heavily on the constitutional structure created by states.  
The idea of an “open” constitution will be entertained, deconstructing whether 
the idea of appealing to other countries to recognize the State is an inherent part 
of certain constitutions.46
The link between domestic law and international law is not a preposterous 
notion in international or even domestic law for the United States; the 
connection between the two forms of law has been constitutionally recognized 
for decades.  The central question is not whether international law is part of 
federal law, but rather which forms of international law ought to be considered 
part of federal law.  The U.S. Constitution notes the importance of treaties as 
part of the law of the United States,47 in which treaties are noted as a source of 
law which can be applied and adjudicated upon by the Supreme Court.  This 
clause has often been referred to as the “Supremacy Clause” highlighting the 
sources of law that the Supreme Court may apply and holding it as the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  Furthermore, authors such as Henkin have held that 
The Paquete Habana48 case is authority for the proposition that international 
law is part of U.S. law.  He maintains that the only issue is whether customary 
international law should also be considered part of U.S. federal law.49 Other 
authors concur that international law is part of federal law,50 and rely upon the 
“Charming Betsy”51 canon to elevate international law norms above those of 
state norms.  The position of treaties in the U.S. Constitution equally supports 
the idea of the constitutionally-regarded importance of international law.52 As 
derived from constitutional norms, international legal rules appear to have an 
elevated position in U.S. federal law, as part of the constitutional provisions.
The significance of the Supreme Court in affirming the above argument is 
clear: both cases highlight the importance of international law and the way in 
which it supports the adoption of international norms at the domestic level.  
However, it should be noted that both cases are not modern, and that other 
theories demonstrate more effectively the way in which international law norms 
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, OXFORD U. PRESS (1979). 
 45. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171.  Regional instruments, such as ECHR, have their own courts and enforcement mechanisms, but 
the lack of executive backing can mean that rights violations remain without redress. 
 46. Koh, supra note 40. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 48. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
 49. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555, 1555–
56 (1984). 
 50. See Henkin, supra note 49; Cope, supra note 28. 
 51. See Curtis A. Bradley, The ‘Charming Betsy’ Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking 
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L. J. 479 (1998). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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connect to the domestic system.53 The Supreme Court continues to play a role 
through suffusing international norms with its reasoning, rather than open 
agreement via treaties and other international agreements.  The use of 
international norms as part of the normative choices made by the Supreme 
Court may demonstrate a significant degree of what Louis Henkin notes as 
“slippage”54 and Harold Hongju Koh refers to as internalization.55
Henkin’s idea is based on the notion that international law pervades 
domestic systems and that the Senate cannot maintain a cast-iron grip on the 
interpretation of norms.56  When the Supreme Court begins to interpret 
international law, it may do so in a way which is vastly different from that 
envisaged by Senate.  Taking this idea further, the use of international law in 
domestic courts makes the judiciary more familiar with international legal 
principles, which inescapably affects their reasoning: McGinnis’s idea of a 
complete and clear separation between the domestic constitutional system and 
the international system presumes a barrier between the two which does not 
exist.57 Spiro equally supports the idea that international legal norms need not 
be wholly adopted by the domestic to have effect, and that compliance may be 
“secured by other means.”58  This indirect effect is most likely to be political 
or economic, but the increasing relevance of international legal norms in areas 
such as human rights may mean that that only precedents to persuade and 
exemplify the application of rules in particular situations are those from foreign 
and international sources.  The “other means” may be the only aids to 
interpretation available, rather than an economic imperative.
Koh argues that international law forms part of the domestic system’s 
norms because of the way in which international legal norms operate.59 He 
argues that norms are internalized through interaction and interpretation in three 
specific areas: social, political, and legal.60 The social aspect of internalization, 
according to Koh, relates to the norm acquiring “public legitimacy” and 
achieves widespread adoption.61 The political internalization occurs when the 
political elites adopt the norm and accept its use,62 while the legal 
internalization relates to the legal use of the norm, transforming the norm into 
a domestic legal rule through means such as executive action or judicial 
 53. See Andrea Bianchi, International Law Theories: An Inquiry Into Different Ways of 
Thinking, OXFORD U. PRESS (2016). 
 54. Henkin, supra note 21, at 415. 
 55. Harold Hongju Koh, 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. 
REV. 623 (1999). 
 56. See Henkin, supra note 21. 
 57. John McGinnis, Contemporary Foreign and International Law in Constitutional 
Construction, 69 ALB. L. REV. 801, 808 (2006). 
 58. Spiro, supra note 33, at 1040. 
 59. Koh, supra note 55, at 726. 
 60. Id. at 626. 
 61. Id. at 642. 
 62. Id. 
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interpretation.63 Through these interactions and subsequent need for 
interpretation of norms, these norms then have a domestic impact through 
internalization.64 This could happen through Presidential action and, in fact, 
arguably the President would have the greatest potential to internalize 
international norms.  As argued by Johnstone, the exercise of soft power has 
the potential to internalize norms through the exchange and acceptance of 
different values.65 The exercise of soft power by the President could internalize
and accept norms, but not in an effective, or legally binding, fashion.  The 
internalization of norms by the Supreme Court, however, makes the norms part 
of the domestic system and raises a persuasive argument for the continual 
application of international norms at the domestic level.
Thus, international law relies upon the domestic constitutional order to 
become part of the domestic legal system: expressly, through the ratification of 
treaties and subsequent internalization of the norms, or through the influence 
of customary international law, which could be internalized.  However, the 
necessity of one system to another is made possible through the drafting of what 
could be described as an “open” constitution: one which permits reference to 
other systems and forms of law.  The U.S. Constitution is more open than many 
others, with its explicit reference to the supremacy of treaty law over other types 
of law, as discussed above.  Koh argues that the reason for this can be traced 
back to the timing of the U.S. Constitution, in which the “fledgling” U.S. sought 
to appeal to other countries to recognize it as an independent entity.66 The 
openness towards other countries is furthered by Martin’s thesis that the U.S. 
Constitution is, in fact, a treaty.67 He argues that the U.S. Constitution is a 
treaty among U.S. states and should be considered international law.68 The 
logical conclusion to this perspective is that international law can then be safely 
and openly internalized in domestic law on account of the fact that the U.S. 
Constitution makes it directly part of domestic law, since states have accepted 
the U.S. Constitution.  Even writers such as McGinnis and Somin struggle to 
contend with this argument and are limited to stating that only customary 
international law should not be considered directly part of U.S. law.69
However, the notion of the U.S. Constitution as a treaty disregards the reliance 
that international law has on a domestic constitutional order.  By ignoring the 
importance of the domestic order created by governments and enforced by 
domestic courts, the international order is unified entirely with the domestic 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Ian Johnstone, US-UN Relations After Iraq: The End of the World (Order) as We Know It?, 
15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 813 (2004). 
 66. Koh, supra note 40. 
 67. Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution as Treaty, CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS (2007). 
 68. Id. 
 69. John McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1175, 1247 (2007). 
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system.  Although there is overlap, this is clearly not an accurate depiction of 
the international system as it operates.  The U.S. Constitution’s appeal to the 
international community for recognition is only possible because the state 
existed outside the international order and sought recognition in order to 
become part of it.  Recognition would be a key part of accessing rights 
internationally as a state, but the state machinery and constitutional operation 
would be required in order to secure that recognition.  A full discussion of self-
determination is out of the scope of this work, but it is worth highlighting that 
the domestic system must exist for the international system to function.
A good way of demonstrating the importance of this is the concept in 
international law of complementarity, exemplified most clearly through the 
approach of the International Criminal Court.  Via the Rome Statute, the 
International Criminal Court pushes international responsibility back to the 
nation state by requiring the state to prosecute and punish criminal offences.70
Rather than the International Criminal Court being the central organ for 
enforcement, the state must take primary responsibility for the prosecution and 
punishment of serious violations of international criminal law.71 The 
International Criminal Court will not undertake prosecution, unless the nation 
state is “unwilling or unable,”72 placing the nation state at the center of the 
system for enforcing international criminal law.  Although the ICC is a separate 
institution from the domestic system, and is perhaps one of the few examples 
of international law functioning without ongoing state support, the significance 
of its recourse to the state machinery for enforcement should not be 
underestimated.
The linkage between nation states and international law endures and there 
is a degree of reliance on state machinery and constitutional law for the 
continuation of the international order.  Such an approach undermines Spiro’s 
argument that sovereignty is in its twilight;73 his approach is only defensible 
from the perspective that any enduring division between international law and 
domestic law is fading, rather than the interpretation that the sovereignty of 
nation states is dying.  The idea that the individual states’ constitutional order 
will not endure is undeniable, as there is currently no structure that international 
law can use to supplant that of state constitutional machinery.  Consequently, a 
hard, impermeable sovereignty has arguably not existed since the Second 
World War, or only exists in isolationist states, but there remains a requirement 
for a domestic system until international structures can be built or development 
to bridge the gap.  Any notion posited by President Trump that an isolationist 
 70. Article 1, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
 71. Federica Gioia, State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and “Modern” International Law: The 
Principle of Complementarity in the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 1095 
(2006). 
 72. Article 17, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
 73. Peter J. Spiro, Sovereigntism’s Twilight, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 307 (2013). 
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policy will operate with the degree of success he would wish is overly 
optimistic, at best, unless he begins to deconstruct the domestic system first.  
This Part of the work will look at the idea of global constitutionalism and iterate 
the argument that the international system relies upon the domestic system for 
the continued development of the international order.
A functioning and effective international system, with a reliable rule of 
law, is wholly dependent on the domestic system in order to operate 
successfully.  The basis of the rule of law has been held by several authors to 
reflect clarity and consistency of the law.74 Bingham’s account, in particular, 
noted the centrality of human rights and equality before the law as the 
significant elements of a rule of law, and writers viewing the idea of the rule of 
law from an international perspective endorse the importance of human rights 
as part of a modern conception of the rule of law.75  Reliance on clarity and 
consistency as the sole defining characteristics of a rule of law is considered to 
be overly simplistic, and so human rights is a central part to a rule of law.  The 
connection between the domestic systems is augmented by the increased 
importance of human rights for an enduring rule of law: As argued by Kleinlein, 
international law depends on respect for human rights at the domestic level to 
ensure the same respect for rights at the international level.76
Furthermore, the rule of law requires courts to ensure its enforcement.77
Domestic courts are best placed to ensure that the rule of law is respected and 
that the values of the international community are enforced.78 Indeed, 
d’Aspremont argues that the global order rests on global values79 and for the 
continuation of that order and of those values, a court must uphold them.80
Constitutional law is a requirement for the continuation of the international 
order.  It should be noted at this juncture that it is not any domestic system 
which would support the international order, but rather democratic systems 
with respect for human rights.  International law is entirely dependent on 
constitutional domestic protections for its continuation, and a failure of 
domestic systems would lead to the eventual failure of the international human 
rights system.  This concept is based upon the idea of internalization,
enunciated by Koh, in part, but also based on the acknowledged contribution of 
domestic systems to the formation and endurance of customary international 
law norms.  Although McGinnis’s fears were of the incorporation of “raw” 
 74. Bingham, supra note 44; Raz, supra note 44. 
 75. McCorquodale, supra note 44; Besson, supra note 44; Keith, supra note 44. 
 76. Thomas Kleinlein, On Holism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Approaches to Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1075 (2010). 
 77. Bingham, supra note 44. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See Jean d’Aspremont, The Foundations of the International Legal Order, 18 FINNISH 
YEARBOOK INT’L L. 219 (2009). See also Johannes Gerald Van Mulligen, Global Constitutionalism 
and the Objective Purport of the International Legal Order, 24 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 277 (2011). 
 80. See d’Aspremont, supra note 79. 
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international law in the domestic U.S. system,81 the international system is 
reliant on democratic domestic system to avoid autocratic norms and the abuse 
of human rights becoming the default customary position.  It is a distant and 
unlikely possibility, but highlighting that possibility demonstrates the role that 
democratic domestic systems play in the international system.
Because of this, it is necessary that there is a continuation of democracy 
at the domestic level to develop resilience in international legal norms.  In this 
way, American exceptionalism is not really such an obstruction for the 
international system.  Politically, exceptionalism is almost a required 
continuation of policy for any U.S. President and the Congressional lawmakers, 
but respect for human rights in the U.S. Constitution prevents any significant 
impact from being made at the international level.  In cases such as Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld82 and Boumediene v. Bush,83 a rejection of international law norms 
made little difference where domestic norms, which protect individual rights, 
were used instead.  In Kumm’s view, this is because the international system 
stabilizes the domestic system;84 these cases demonstrate that the domestic 
norms were not only available, but applied satisfactorily by the Supreme Court.  
This domestic jurisprudence strengthened international law, rather than 
enshrining exceptionalism in international law,85 and also provides a useful 
example of the political expediency, rather than the concrete effect, of 
American exceptionalism.
The independent interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by the U.S. 
Supreme Court demonstrates the way in which American exceptionalism does 
not have the effect of undermining the international system despite the power 
that the U.S. wields at the international level.  Although there is undoubtedly 
comfort in constitutional norms, where these reflect international norms, the 
international system is strengthened.  The U.S. Supreme Court has the power 
to make normative choices about the rules it applies, but Ku and Yoo86 argue 
that the U.S. Constitution does not permit the Supreme Court to look to 
international law and embed such norms in its judgments unless these have 
already been internalized by Congress or the President.87 Ku and Yoo’s work 
highlights the similarity of U.S. constitutional norms and international legal 
norms, and indicates that the choices the Supreme Court should make should 
be predicated on internalized international law or constitutional norms.  
However, they neglect the idea that the U.S. Constitution reflects much of 
 81. John McGinnis, The Comparative Disadvantage of Customary International Law, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7 (2007). 
 82. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 83. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 84. Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004). 
 85. Fleur Johns, Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613 
(2006). 
 86. Ku & Yoo, supra note 11. 
 87. Id. 
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international law norms.  Their argument also stands on the premise that the 
separation between international law and constitutional law should be 
maintained as separate on account of the democratic deficit in international law: 
they view the incorporation of self-executing treaties to U.S. law as a 
constitutional betrayal, as the Constitution should function without input from 
other countries.88  This disregards the idea that a strong domestic system 
supports the international system effectively, rather than the reverse position 
undermining the domestic system.  As Cope has noted, siding with international 
law is politically unpopular,89 and thus constitutional norms are the typical 
recourse for a court such as the Supreme Court of the United States.
The existence of domestic constitutional orders and democracies is 
required for the rule of law, and a strong domestic system enhances the 
international rule of law.  Because of this, the anxiety of those who view the 
world with internationalist eyes is unwarranted thus far.  Nativists, such as 
Trump, fondly mention the U.S. Constitution with pride and a sense of 
ownership that would be notably absent in reference to global affairs.90 Koh 
notes that this preference is not restricted to the Presidency and, indeed, the 
Supreme Court appear to prefer to root their reasoning in domestic 
constitutional norms.91 However, it is such a nativist perspective that ought to 
be more aware of Trump’s intentions than the internationalists of the world.  
International law is reasonably safe and indeed strengthened by Trump’s acts, 
while the domestic institutions may be at greater risk from his actions.  There 
are innumerable possibilities which could result from Trump’s future executive 
orders and his continued focus on the travel ban, but there is a limit to their 
effect in international law, unless he decides to make good on his promise to 
undermine the “archaic” constitutional provisions he views as obstructive to 
efficient government.92 The possibilities outlined below are the damage to the 
domestic constitutional system his regime may do, and the effect this could 
have on the U.S.’s position in the international system.
In an interview with CNN in April 2017, Trump stated:
You look at the rules of the Senate, even the rules of the House—but the 
rules of the Senate and some of the things you have to go through—it’s 
really a bad thing for the country, in my opinion.  They’re archaic rules.  
And maybe at some point we’re going to have to take those rules on, 
because, for the good of the nation, things are going to have to be 
different.93 
 88. Id. 
 89. Cope, supra note 28. 
 90. Trump, supra note 10. 
 91. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 92. Martha McCallum, President Trump Reflects on His First 100 Days, FOX NEWS (Apr. 28, 
2017), http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2017/04/28/president-trump-reflects-on-his-first-100-
days.html [https://perma.cc/55JG-F7X4]. 
 93. McCallum, supra note 92. 
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Previous interviews and public statements have highlighted his disdain for 
the judicial decisions, which have undermined his proposed travel ban,94 and 
taken together, he appears unimpressed with the current constitutional order.  It 
is this which would be in the greatest danger, and which would have the greatest 
impact on the international system, if Trump wished to make good on his public 
statements to remove the domestic constitutional protections.  Damage would 
most likely be done to the domestic system first: as Spiro notes, compliance 
with norms can be secured by other means,95 in terms of international trade.  
Even Trump recognizes that “international sales”96 are of import for the U.S.  
But normative constitutional protections for rights and so forth could be 
undermined for the domestic population without a great deal beyond political 
pressure effecting any change.  There is no guarantee that political pressure 
would effect that change.
It would be naïve to assume that the international system would fail 
without the United States and vice versa on a short-term, and indeed this would 
be an extreme situation. However, perceptibly reductions in freedom and rights 
could reduce the influence that the U.S. would have.  The international rule of 
law requires stable democracies at the domestic level, with functioning, 
independent courts in order to be secure.  This could be undermined by any 
impact on the domestic constitutional order.  Johnstone highlights Koh’s 
argument that there is a positive angle to American exceptionalism, in that it 
provides a degree of leadership and support for global governance.97 However,
this influence endures only as long as the domestic protections exist via 
Congress and the U.S. Constitution.  The restraints on Presidential power 
outlined above would need to function strongly to prevent, among other 
consequences, a loss of U.S. influence on the international plane.
Constitutional law is required for the international rule of law, and stable 
democracies allow the development of the international rule of law.  The post-
state world does not exist, or at least the vision thereof has not yet been realized,
but the international system has become more integrated over time.98 There is 
thus a greater degree of reliance among states, but states remain at the center of 
the international system.  Through control of both land and populations, as well
as the potential to limit economic power through legal and political means, 
statehood is one of the main ways by which an entity can be a significant agent 
of action at the international level.  International norms thus have an impact on 
domestic systems, but constitutional norms allow the state itself to participate 
in that international system.
 94. Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105, 2017 WL 469608 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017) 
 95. Spiro, supra note 33. 
 96. Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/28/remarks-
president-trump-joint-address-congress [http://perma.cc/2S9F-5KZB]. 
 97. Johnstone, supra note 65. 
 98. De Wet, supra note 43. 
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The existence, and continued relevance of this debate, reflects the growing 
importance of international law99 on the domestic system, and the continuing 
influence that it will have.  However, the destabilizing effect that a President, 
such as Trump, would have is limited on the basis that the international system, 
and the international rule of law, is rooted in the domestic order of stable 
democracies.  Although his policies may appear chaotic and his public 
statements are frequent, there is nothing to suggest that he is due to have any 
concrete action.  A view of his executive orders so far, as well as the launching 
of rockets towards Syria, demonstrate a continuation of existing U.S. policy,100
rather than sharp breaks with the past.  States which are stable democracies and 
which are run as such further the development of the international rule of law.  
This work has demonstrated that the main protection for and development of 
the international rule of law is rooted in the domestic order, because global 
constitutionalism is based on statehood and nation states.  States which uphold 
democratic standards through their democratic institutions and which maintain 
constitutional protections for human rights are simultaneously upholding 
international standards: the constitutional protections and respect for rights at 
the international level is only possible if safeguarded at the national level.  
Consequently, strong domestic systems further the international rule of law and 
the U.S. is of particular import because of its political and economic power and 
influence.  Donald Trump, as a relatively new President, is learning how the 
complex constitutional and political system works and is developing an 
understanding of exactly how restrained his powers are by the constitution.  
Tests of those restraints are particularly useful in a politically engaged country, 
because of the likelihood that the courts will hear cases on the matter.  The 
dispensing of further judgments on constitutional points secures the 
development of the rule of law at the domestic level, and further cases may 
contribute to the development of the international rule of law.
As demonstrated above, the internalization of international norms can 
arise in a number of ways: via Presidential exercise of soft, executive power, 
via the adoption of treaties by Congress, or through the exercise of judgment 
by the Supreme Court.  As the power to internalize norms via Congress stems 
from the Constitution, the Supreme Court sits atop this normative hierarchy as 
it possesses the sole authority to interpret the Constitution.  The role of the 
Supreme Court is key in both restraining the President, and even Congress, but 
also in developing the international rule of law.
However, any attempt at the deconstruction of constitutional protections 
would jeopardize both the domestic and international rule of law for the U.S.  
Domestic protections secure the rule of law in both spheres, and Trump’s 
 99. Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 445 (2006). 
 100. See Eyal Benvenisti, The U.S. and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and the 
Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 677 (2004) (discussing the Bush doctrine and 
demonstrating how little U.S. foreign policy on the use of force has changed in the past two decades). 
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comments in the CNN interview, highlighted above, demonstrates his growing 
awareness of the constitutional limits on his office.  His further acts, providing 
these are the subject of litigation, are helpful and supportive of international 
law as long as the domestic institutions persist.  A failure to uphold the domestic 
institutions would undermine the cherished constitutional protections of 
democracy in the U.S., and would undermine the international rule of law.
